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Abstract
The two somewhat conflicting requirements of efficiency and fairness make ATFM an un-
satisfactorily solved problem, despite its overwhelming importance. In this paper, we present
an economics motivated solution that is based on the notion of a free market. Our contention
is that in fact the airlines themselves are the best judge of how to achieve efficiency and our
market-based solution gives them the ability to pay, at the going rate, to buy away the desired
amount of delay on a per flight basis.
The issue of fairness is simply finessed away by our solution – whoever pays gets smaller
delays. We show how our solution has the potential of enabling travelers from a large spectrum
of affordability and punctuality requirements to achieve an end that is most desirable to them.
Our market model is particularly simple, requiring only one parameter per flight from the
airline company. Furthermore, we show that it admits a combinatorial, strongly polynomial
algorithm for computing an equilibrium landing schedule and prices.
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1 Introduction
Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) remains an unsatisfactorily solved problem despite massive
efforts on the part of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), airline companies, and even
academia. Moreover, this comes despite the fact that, especially in inclement weather, this state
of affairs results in huge monetary losses and delays1. In a nutshell, the reason for this is that
any viable solution needs to satisfy two somewhat conflicting requirements: in addition to ensuring
efficiency it also needs to be viewed as “fair” by all parties involved. Indeed, [BFT11] state that
“ ... While this work points at the possibility of dramatically reducing delay costs to the airline
industry vis-a-vis current practice, the vast majority of these proposals remain unimplemented.
The ostensible reason for this is fairness ... .”
Within academia, research on this problem started with the pioneering work of Odoni [Odo87] and
it flourished with the extensive work of Bertsimas; we refer the reader to [BBCF09, BG10] for
thorough literature overviews and an up-to-date list of references to important papers.
In this paper, we are proposing a radically different solution to the problem. Our solution is based
on over a century of work in mathematical economics that has established the free market principle
of Adam Smith as a remarkably efficient method for allocating scarce resources among alternative
uses (sometimes stated in the colorful language of the “invisible hand of the market”). The goods
in our novel market are delays and the buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the
FAA to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis. Our solution achieves efficiency
as well as fairness in a totally different manner than the solutions proposed so far.
In the centralized solutions proposed so far, FAA decides a schedule that is efficient, e.g., it decides
which flights most critically need to be served first in order to minimize cascading delays in the
entire system. Our contention is that in fact the airlines themselves are the best judge of how to
achieve efficiency. They know best if a certain flight needs to be served first because it is carrying
CEOs of important companies who have paid a premium in order to reach their destination on
time or if delaying a certain flight by 30 minutes will not have dire consequences, however delaying
it longer would propagate delays through their entire system and result in a huge loss. For such
critical flights, our market-based solution gives the airline company the ability to pay, at the going
rate, to buy away the desired amount of delay.
Interestingly, the sticky issue of fairness is simply finessed away by our solution – whoever pays gets
smaller delays. Moreover, it opens up the possibility of making diverse types of travelers happy
through the following mechanism: the additional revenues generated by FAA via our market gives
it the ability to subsidize landing fees for low budget airlines. As a result, both types of travelers
can achieve an end that is most desirable to them, business travelers and casual/vacation travelers.
The former, in inclement weather, will not be made to suffer delays that ruin their important
meetings and latter will get to fly for a lower price (and perhaps sip coffee for an additional hour
on the tarmac, in inclement weather, while thinking about their upcoming vacation).
As is turns out, designing a market for this problem is not straightforward – the requirements on
1According to [BBCF09], the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee estimated that in 2007, the loss to the
U.S. economy was $25.7 billion, due to 2.75 million hours of flight delays. In contrast, the total profit of U.S. airlines
in that year was $5 billion.
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the solution are many and the classical market models of Fisher [BS00] and Arrow-Debreu [AD54]
simply do not apply to this setting. The most important requirements are:
• Simplicity: The information needed from an airline for a particular flight should be very
small (in particular, it should not be a utility function, as needed in the classical market
models). Typically flights have numerous special requirements, e.g., because of aircraft type.
Also, they have a myriad interdependencies with other flights – because of the use of the same
aircraft for subsequent flights, passengers connecting with other flights, crew connecting with
other flights, etc. Hence, the basic concept needs to be so simple that it leaves plenty of scope
for dealing with these complexities.
• Efficient computability: Today, the moderate and large airports handle hundreds of flights
every day; in fact, the 30 busiest airports handle anywhere from 1000 to 3000 flights per day.
Hence, it is important that the schedule and prices be computable efficiently. Moreover, to
realize the desirable consequences of a competitive equilibrium, the prices should be such
that there is parity between supply and demand – and this despite recent negative results on
computability of equilibria in even fairly special cases of traditional market models, e.g., see
[VY11].
In our market model, the basic solution requires airlines to specify only one parameter, called
criticality factor, for each of flight. A more elaborate solution, which allows airlines to present
a much more complex set of requirements, requires them to specify a delay function as well (see
Section 4). We give a special LP in which parameters can be set according to the prevailing
conditions on a particular day. It turns out that the underlying matrix of this LP is totally
unimodular and hence it admits an integral optimal solution; such a solution yields an equilibrium
schedule for the day. The dual of this LP yields equilibrium landing prices. We further show that
both can be found via an algorithm for the minimum weight perfect b-matching problem and hence
can be computed combinatorially in strongly polynomial time.
In this paper, we handle the case of one airport only and we have deliberately kept the setting as
simple as possible so as to convey the main idea clearly, e.g., we have assumed that all flights are
equivalent as far as assignment of landing slots goes (this is of course far from true in practice,
because of the widely varying sizes of aircraft). Considering the simplicity and computational
efficiency of our solution, we believe there is plenty of potential for extending this approach to more
complex and realistic settings and even to generalize it to scheduling simultaneously for multiple
airports2. We leave these exciting problems for future research.
2 The Market Model
We will consider the problem of scheduling landings at one airport only. Let A be the set of all
flights, operated by various airlines, that land in this airport in a day. For i ∈ A, the airline of
this flight decides its criticality factor, denoted by αi. In a formal sense, αi is the dollar value, as
2According to [BBCF09], current research has mostly remained at the level of a single airport because of compu-
tational tractability reasons.
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viewed by the airline, for a delay of unit time incurred by flight i. Thus, if this flight incurs a delay
of d units, the cost of the delay incurred by the airline is αi · d (for simplicity, we will first assume
that the dollar value to the airline is a linear function of the delay; we will elaborate on this later).
We will assume that the entire day is partitioned into a set of landing time-slots in a manner that
is most convenient for this airport. Let B denote this set. Each slot s has a capacity c(s) ∈ Z+
specifying the number of flights that can land in this time-slot. We will assume that c(s) is adjusted
according to the prevailing weather conditions.
After taking into consideration the prevailing weather conditions, for each flight i, FAA decides a
landing window, denoted by W (i), which gives the set of time-slots available for this flight. Thus,
if there are no delays, the earliest time-slot in W (i) will be the scheduled arrival time of this flight
(or a slightly earlier time, if there is a need to plan for before-time arrival). If there are delays,
W (i) is adjusted by the FAA. The exact manner in which this adjustment is made affects the delays
of flights critically and therefore the FAA needs to have a well-thought-out policy for this. This
adjustment also gives FAA a way of controlling delays of individual flights; we explain this further
in Section 4. For s ∈W (i), di(s) is the delay incurred by flight i, beyond its scheduled arrival time,
if it were to land in time-slot s.
A landing schedule is an assignment of flights to time-slots, respecting capacity constraints. Each
time-slot will be assigned a landing price which is the amount charged by FAA from the airline
company if its flight lands in this time-slot. We will define the total cost incurred by a flight to be
the sum of the price paid for landing and the cost of the delay.
We will say that a given schedule and prices are an equilibrium landing schedule and prices if:
1. W.r.t. these prices, each flight incurs a minimum total cost.
2. The landing price of any time-slot that is not filled to capacity is zero. This is a standard
condition in economics; the price of a good that is not fully sold must be zero.
3 LP Formulation and Algorithms
In this section, we will give an LP that yields an equilibrium schedule; its dual will yield equilibrium
landing prices. Section 3.1 shows how they can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
For s ∈W (i), xis will be the indicator variable that indicates whether flight i is scheduled in time-
slot s; naturally, in the LP formulation, this variable will be allowed to take fractional values. The
LP given below obtains a fractional scheduling that minimizes the total dollar value of the delays
incurred by all flights, subject to capacity constraints of the time-slots.
minimize
∑
i∈A
αi
∑
s∈W (i)
di(s)xis (1)
subject to ∀i ∈ A :
∑
s∈R(i)
xis ≥ 1
∀s ∈ B :
∑
i s.t. s∈W (i)
xis ≤ c(s)
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∀i ∈ A, s ∈W (i) : xis ≥ 0
Let ps denote the dual variable corresponding to the second set of inequalities. We will interpret
ps as the price of landing in time-slot s. Thus if flight i lands in time-slot s, the total cost incurred
by it is ps + αi · di(s). Let ti denote the dual variable corresponding to the first set of inequalities.
In Lemma 1 we will prove that ti is the total cost incurred by flight i w.r.t. the prices found by
the dual; moreover, each flight incurs minimum total cost.
The dual LP is the following.
maximize
∑
i∈A
ti −
∑
s∈B
c(s) · ps (2)
subject to ∀i ∈ A, ∀s ∈W (i) : ti ≤ ps + αi · di(s)
∀i ∈ A : ti ≥ 0
∀s ∈ B : ps ≥ 0
Lemma 1 W.r.t. the prices found by the dual LP (2), each flight i incurs minimum total cost and
it is given by ti.
Proof : Applying complementary slackness conditions to the primal variables we get
∀i ∈ A, ∀s ∈W (i) : xis > 0 ⇒ ti = ps + αi · di(s).
Moreover, for time-slots s ∈W (i) which are not used by flight i, i.e., for which xis = 0, by the dual
constraint, the total cost of using this slot can only be higher than ti. The lemma follows. ✷
The second condition required for equilibrium is satisfied because of complementarity applied to
the variables ps:
If
∑
i s.t. s∈W (i)
xis < c(s), then ps = 0.
3.1 Finding equilibrium prices and schedule in strongly polynomial time
Since the matrix underlying LP (1) is totally unimodular, it has an integral optimal solution. In
this section, we show that the problem of obtaining such a schedule is essentially a minimum weight
perfect b-matching problem and hence can be found in strongly polynomial time, see [Sch03] Volume
A. Furthermore, the dual variables on vertices, pss and tis computed by such an algorithm will yield
equilibrium prices.
Consider the edge-weighted bipartite graph (A′, B,E), with bipartition A′ = A ∪ {v}, where A is
the set of flights and v is a special vertex, and B is the set of time-slots. The set of edges E and
weights are as follows: for i ∈ A, s ∈ W (i), (i, s) is an edge with weight αi · di(s), and for each
s ∈ B, (v, s) is an edge with unit weight.
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The matching requirements are: 1 for each i ∈ A, c(s) for s ∈ B, and
∑
s∈B c(s)−|A| for v; clearly,
we may assume that the last quantity is non-negative, because otherwise the LP is infeasible.
It is straightforward to verify that a minimum weight perfect b-matching in G, if it exists, gives
an optimal solution to LP (1). If such a matching does not exist, the LP is infeasible. If so, the
current capacity of time-slots is insufficient and either some landing windows need to be stretched
appropriately and/or some flights need to be canceled in order to obtain a schedule.
Hence we get.
Theorem 2 There is a combinatorial, strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium
landing schedule and prices for the market model given above.
4 Salient Features of our Solution
We discuss below several salient properties of our solution and the reason it confirms to the re-
quirements of a competitive market.
How should an airline set the criticality factor for a given flight: If this market is run
in an open, complete-information manner, it will soon become obvious to airline companies how
to set the criticality factor of each flight suitably to achieve the desired end. The “going rate” for
buying away delay will essentially be common knowledge.
How are prices set by the dual: By standard LP theory, we get that the price dual variables,
ps, will adjust according to the demand of each time-slot, i.e., a time-slot that is demanded by a
large number of flights having large αis will have a higher price and vice versa. In particular, if a
slot is not allocated to capacity, its price will be zero as shown above. Hence, the price of a slot
will accurately reflect its demand.
How does αi influence the price paid and delay incurred: We first prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 3 The criticality factor, αi, gives an upper bound on the amount of money that will be
charged per unit of delay prevented on flight i, in an average sense.
Proof : Let pt and pt+k be the prices of landing in slots that result in a delay of t time units
and t + k time units, respectively. By Lemma 1, the former will be preferred to the latter only if
pt − pt+k ≤ αi · k, and if so, the average amount charged for saving the k units of delay is at most
αi. ✷
By Lemma 3, a flight with a large αi will incur a smaller delay, at the cost of paying more, and
vice versa, as was desired.
Fixing the landing window: A critical decision on the part of FAA, which has a large bearing
on running this market in a fair manner, is how to fix the landing window for a flight in various
operating conditions. Let us first consider an undesirable way of fixing the window. Suppose flights
f1 and f2 have scheduled arrival times of t and t+ k, respectively. Suppose FAA assigns identical
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landing windows for both flights, starting at time t′ ≥ t+ k. Since the price of landing in any given
time-slot is the same for both flights and they both get the same set of options, flight f1 will be
experiencing an “unfair” additional delay of k time units.
We have already indicated in Section 2 how to fix the landing window in case of no delays. In the
presence of delays, a simple and fair solution is to simply slide the window out equally for each
flight by the minimum delay being experienced at its scheduled landing time and, if the capacities
of time-slots are significantly reduced, then stretch the window appropriately (otherwise LP (1)
may not even be feasible).
Observe that the landing window can be used in another way by FAA – it gives FAA a way of
exercising control, e.g., if it needs to promote/demote flights without changing the parameters
provided by the airlines.
Resorting to a non-linear function di(s) : We have stated above that di(s) is simply the delay
experienced by flight i, beyond its scheduled landing time, if it were to land in time-slot s, i.e., it
is a linear function of delay. Consider the example given in the Introduction of a flight that will
not have dire consequences if delayed by 30 minutes, but will lead to cascading delays through the
entire system if delayed longer. Interestingly, by moving to a more general setup in which airlines
are allowed to provide a non-linear function di(s) to the FAA, we can allow them to express their
desired landing times even in such complex situations.
In the example stated above, this function would increase linearly in the first 30 minutes and then
increase very rapidly. As a consequence, the cost of the delay, and hence ti, will increase very
rapidly if the delay exceeds 30 minutes. Now in order to optimize its objective function, the LP
would be willing to assign the earliest available landing spot, after 30 minutes, even if it is expensive.
Observe that Lemma 1 holds for an arbitrary function di(s) as well. Effectively, by increasing di(s)
rapidly beyond 30 minutes, the airline company is indicating that if the delay exceeds 30 minutes,
it is willing to go with a much more expensive landing spot in order to avoid further delays.
Observe that only monotonically increasing functions di(s) make sense from the viewpoint of the
airlines, since if this function decreases, then flight i may end up getting a slot with a high price
and a large delay.
How fair is this solution: As indicated in the Introduction, our solution has the potential of
enabling travelers from a large spectrum of affordability and punctuality requirements to achieve
an end that is most desirable to them. As long as the market is run in a fair, open manner, and the
airlines make clear to the potential passengers the trade offs, the choices made and what to expect,
the issue of fairness becomes as moot as when a passenger decides whether to pay more and travel
comfortably or pay less and risk ruining their hurting back.
Incentive compatibility: We claim, informally, that the airlines will not be able to game this
solution by cleverly setting the criticality factor: If they set αi too high, they may end up paying
for an expensive landing slot, and if they set it too low, they may have to suffer a longer delay
than desired. We leave the open problems of proving incentive compatibility in a formal sense and
comparing our solution to the VCG solution.
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